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Abstract 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
AND STATE BORDERS 
 
James Benjamin Westmoreland 
B.A., College of William and Mary 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Renee Scherlen, Ph.D. 
 
 
 Nations, states, and borders are constructs. They are imagined where they do 
not truly exist. What a nation is fluctuates as much as the membership of people in 
said nation. Yet, the nation is the culmination of the culture and beliefs of a people. 
States and their borders are fluid, not permanent. Yet, the state is the essential 
building block of international politics and state borders provide the structure for the 
state. Is the fluctuation in national identity responsible for the change in location of 
state borders? This question is answered by conducting a comparison of two case 
studies using the countries Eritrea and South Sudan. Each case is compared to a 
model of nation-state creation exhibited by Germany to see if the creation of a new 
national identity was responsible for a new state and its new borders. The German 
model is a classic model of the influence of national identity on state borders. It was 
expected that the German model is true for new states where national identity is 
created and then dictates border placement. The cases, wherein both Eritrea and South 
Sudan utilized state borders borrowed from their colonial past, did not support this 
!v 
hypothesis. The national identities, forged during the conflicts that lead to the creation 
of Eritrea and South Sudan, failed to materialize based on the markers of national 
identity used. It is likely that the German model failed to predict the method of new 
state creation in these cases because the European experience does not share the 
colonial experience found in many states, including these cases. Further examination 
into the effect of colonialism on the national identity of people living in former 
colonies might form the foundation of a new model describing the relationship 
between national identity and state borders. 
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Introduction 
Near the end of the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson gave his 
Fourteen Point speech identifying the need to separate imperial European states into smaller 
nation-states to better govern and represent the people therein. He stated, “readjustment of 
the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality” and 
“other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” 
(United States Congress 1918). The concept and existence of nation-states prior to 1918 was 
certainly not new, but President Wilson was one of the first to favor the drawing of state 
borders around nations for the purpose of reducing the likelihood of future war. Growing 
national sentiment was suddenly recognized to be at the forefront of causation for 
international conflict and the relationship between national identity and state borders was 
seen as a measure of the potential for conflict. 
Typically, at the heart of any nation are common traits like religion, language, and 
ethnicity. These characteristics create the national identity that reinforces the construct of the 
nation by identifying who those in the nation are as well as who they are not. In this sense, 
nations are as imaginary as states and their borders (Anderson 2006). Both are constructed in 
the minds of those who participate. Without people participating, they cease to exist. Nations 
are the essence of modern nation-states and their borders. Nations provide the backbone for 
loyalty to modern states and state organization. What area people consider their homeland 
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serves as a basis for the state location and, hence, its borders. Nations without a state often 
seek to create a state for themselves. 
State boundaries are found crisscrossing the globe, delineating spaces, and raising 
barriers to movement and trade. These boundaries that separate states from one another have 
multiplied so much that almost all land space on Earth is bounded. Even the uninhabited, 
barren wasteland of Antarctica is divided into research zones supported by territorial claims. 
These borders can be negligible, existing primarily on maps, or they can be tangible, such as 
a geographical feature or fence with checkpoints separating two states. Border placement is 
arbitrary. People place them as dictated by convenience. The rationale for border placement 
can be broad. Geography can often simplify the selection of the site of a border. A border 
frequently reflects military positions at the cessation of hostilities. The negotiated settlement 
after a conflict, or occasionally without conflict, may choose any number of reasons to place 
a border where it will be. This only maintains the question of why one location over another. 
The effect of placing borders, especially when coupled with a physical presence at the 
border in the form of security forces or walls, identifies the limits of the states to which the 
borders belong. In the modern era, state power is no longer invested in the power of an 
individual, such as a monarch, but rather in the control of a territory by the state bureaucracy. 
Clearly delineated borders are necessary for state control. Because modern states are 
dependent on controlling territory, their interests often lie in expanding that territory in ways 
that benefit their own power. Pushing borders out, however, can come with significant costs. 
When the state and the nation are not the same, borders are likely to shift again. 
How does national identity affect the creation of borders? This question looks at 
alternatives to geography or conflict as the basis for where borders are placed. Rather the 
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need is to understand what basis identity provides for where and why a border should be. The 
self-conception of a people as a nation provides a need for a state, and a modern state 
requires borders. Conflict alters borders, but when national identity is found at the heart of 
border conflict then national identity is at the heart of the creation of borders. As such, 
national identity provides a strong rationale for border placement. Other forces, such as 
economic value of land and natural geography, may be utilized to justify border placement, 
but they are often subservient to nationalist goals founded by changes to the national identity. 
The study of national identity has only recently returned to prominence within 
political science (Smith 1991). The end of the Cold War has shifted focus from ideology to 
identity. Ideology, represented in the Cold War by national systems of economic and political 
policies, was used to explain state behavior rather than identity, which explains why those 
policies were used. The potential effect of national identity on border placement is central to 
the question of the origin of state power, a core concept with political science. How people 
spatially divide and administer themselves is perhaps the most obvious political action at the 
international level. Because state power is dependent on controlling territory, the borders 
defining the location and limits of said territory are significant for the study of power in 
international politics. Often, the study of borders is relegated to what role they play in 
international politics rather than where they are located. Yet, location of borders determines 
much of the politics between the states that share the border. 
In order to address how national identity affects borders, this paper compares two 
case studies. These cases involve similar and recent state creations and thus newly created 
borders. A model of European nation-state creation is used to determine whether or not these 
states followed the German model of state creation involving the creation of a national 
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identity. European states are frequently seen as the origin of the modern nation-state. It is 
often assumed that new states will form as some states in Europe did, by aligning around a 
common national identity. Do newer states in the international community follow the 
European model, as frequently assumed? 
The first chapter explores the German model and provides necessary explanation of 
the factors of national identity. Previous arguments are examined and a theoretical approach 
is discussed. The second chapter examines the case of Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia and 
the resulting border creation. The third chapter examines the case of South Sudan’s secession 
from Sudan and the creation of that border. Each case is analyzed separately according to the 
German model. This thesis concludes with a comparison of the result of the analysis of both 
cases. 
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Chapter One: National Identity and State Borders 
This thesis explores the relationship between the creation of a modern nation-state 
and national identity. Peoples with similar traits conceive of themselves as a single people. 
This common identity is the basis of their national identity, which then gives birth to the 
nation. Nations attempt to create within themselves the bureaucracy needed to provide 
governance, which becomes the basis of the state. The state will then delineate its boundaries 
so as to separate itself from others and consolidate power in and over the area of the 
delineated space. Thus, national identity provides the rationale for the structure of state 
borders. The goal for many nations is to create a nation-state. 
The German Model 
The state is frequently used as the primary unit of observation in international 
relations. A state is a single government controlling a specific area (Quackenbush 2015). 
States are sovereign in international politics, in the sense that they alone have control over 
their own territory and thus have a monopoly of violence within the state’s territory (Gellner 
and Breuilly 2008). Yet, states are not “actors.” The people living within a state direct state 
actions. States frequently reflect the people and the perception of “us versus them.” 
It is customary in political science to attribute the origin of nation-states to Europe 
(Anderson 2006). There are two models common to Europe regarding how nation-states are 
created. The French model describes how a nation becomes a nation-state by way of 
eliminating or assimilating all other nations within the boundaries of the state. The German 
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model describes how a nation simply draws a boundary around itself (Vick 2002; Wilson 
2007). The creation of the German nation-state provides a useful example of how nation-
states emerge. Prior to the creation of Germany, multiple smaller nations existed in the area 
that shared a common heritage. Prussian leadership advocated for confederating into a 
singular Germany nation-state (Avraham 2008). People with inherent similarities created a 
national identity resulting in the creation of a nation-state. 
Though it is a difficult term to define, a nation is a community of people with a 
similar culture, language, and beliefs (Anderson 2006; Smith 1991; Quackenbush 2015). This 
is somewhat misleading because although all in a nation share traits, no one in the nation can 
know all those in it to verify this idea. For this reason, the nation is seen as an “imagined 
political community” large enough so that no member knows all other members but is also 
finite in size (Anderson 2006, 6-7). Nations form around a singular identity of who those 
within the nation are, which is also bookended by who they are not. National identity 
involves a sense of belonging to a political, cultural, and linguistic community (Smith 1991; 
Anderson 2006). 
National identity is as fluid as the culture that defines it. There is no nation that 
always has been or is biologically defined. National identities are created and form 
communities that are imagined (Anderson 2006). People identify themselves as belonging to 
communities and communities identify territories as their own. As people inhabit locations, 
the locations become a part of the identity of the people, a homeland. The conceptualization 
of a people as being a nation is more than just the cultural markers that make up their 
communal identity (Poole 1999, 68). Certain markers develop that form the cultural 
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separation of people before they desire the territorial separation. The most common markers 
of national identity are language, ethnicity, and religion. 
Language 
Language is one of the most obvious ways in which people separate themselves. As a 
marker of culture, people learn their language as they are brought into the culture of their 
ancestors. Language also has a locational quality based on social interaction. Language can 
be split into several types: vernacular, administrative, and print. The vernacular language is 
commonly spoken, which is to say it is spoken at home and learned from ancestors. 
Administrative language is the language spoken across a region for the purposes of 
organization. This is the language chosen to standardize business and political bureaucracy 
across a larger area and is the first real instance of nationalization (Anderson 2006, 41-2). An 
example of an administrative language would be High German for Germany, which was used 
over multiple related and unrelated languages spoken within the governed territory. Print 
language is a function of the administrative language in that it spreads the administrative 
language of choice (Anderson 2006, 44-6). The print language also has the effect of bending 
similar dialects toward the administrative language, effectively eliminating the particular 
language or dialect of a nearby area first within political culture and eventually altogether. 
Though it was common to use natural geographic features to identify where states 
existed, these borders and the states bound to them did not consider the people living there. 
The identification of places where people spoke a similar language was a much more 
effective tool for identifying what was actually German land (Vick 2002, 23; Anderson 2006). 
What constitutes Germany, by this measure, is seen in the flexibility of the borders in relation 
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to the movement of German people, which caused significant problems in the twentieth 
century. 
Ethnicity 
Ethnicity is sometimes considered an unlikely contributor to national identity. 
Though it would seem obvious to some, ethnicity is only present as a factor in what is 
considered the Eastern model of national identity. The Western model considers similar 
customs and laws instead (Smith 1991, 12). The usefulness of ethnicity as a national 
identifier over customs and laws is that ethnicity is a characteristic of people considered 
before customs and laws come into effect, specifically the relevance of family. “The nation is 
seen as a fictive ‘super-family,’” which provides the basis for trust in each other over those 
who are not members (Smith 1991, 12). Customs and laws can be common to many people 
who do not consider themselves of the same nation. In order to create an ethnic identity, a 
people can identify themselves as being similar to one another and also identify themselves 
as being separate from others (Smith 1986; Smith 1991, 23-4). 
Some states come about by way of the removal of all but one ethnicity within a given 
area (O’Leary 2003, 53). The result is a singular ethnic nation with an identified homeland 
that is bounded by state borders (Wilson 2007). Germany did not follow this route. Instead, 
Germany was created by design from the coalescing of multiple kingdoms of people who all 
shared a common ethnic background (Vick 2002, 21). The Germanic people were ethnically 
distinct from the French, Italians, and Poles surrounding them. 
Religion 
Religious community is less prominent as a source for national identity in the modern 
world, but it was substantially more useful in the pre-industrial world. Religion held a grip on 
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the organization of people that in many ways prevented the rise of any national identity 
(Anderson 2006, 36). It cannot be denied however that religion has organized people into 
groups and provided similar customs that are stronger than those gained by politics alone 
(Coakley 2012, 71-2). 
Akin to the use of ethnicity and language for identifying German borders was a 
common conception of religious unity. German peoples were mostly Protestant while the 
surrounding states were comprised of Catholics and Orthodox Christians (Vick 2002). The 
Prussians, who became the force behind the creation of a German nation-state, built the 
concept of the German nation around the idea of the protection of state values, namely the 
Protestant values that they held (Avraham 2008, 528-9). Germany, as it was conceived, took 
on the Protestant values of those who created the German national identity. Though the 
German national identity did not discriminate against Catholics, at least initially, the border 
for Germany was drawn around Protestants and not Catholics. 
Nationalism 
Nationalism is the “ideological movement” of national identity (Smith 1991, vii). 
Though not a marker of national identity, nationalism “invents nations where they do not 
exist” (Gellner 1964, 169). Nationalism is the source of the sentiment that the nation and the 
state should be made one as a nation-state (Gellner and Breuilly 2008). Although nationalism 
is often the force that drives a nation to make a state for itself, behind that force is the 
national identity. People must first conceive of themselves as being a nation distinct from 
others before they can utilize that identity to strive for statehood. 
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Homelands and Borders 
Only when homelands are discussed does national identity begin to become clearer. 
Inherent to most nations is the sense of a homeland, or a geographic location where the 
nation and all of its identity was initially created (Smith 2006). Not all nations are 
geographically located in a similar region, but nations tend to have a start point. If they do 
not, one is selected. Borders are separated from borderlands in terms of finiteness. Borders, 
or borderlines, are specified and mapped as lines on the ground that separate two areas 
(Diener and Hagen 2010). Borderlands are the areas on either side of a border, even when the 
border is not specifically marked. Borderlands can be especially characterized by the overlap 
of two neighboring states or nations. As a nation forms a national identity, a homeland is 
created which will inevitably have overlapping borderlands with other nations. The goal for 
any nation is to occupy their chosen homeland and surround themselves with borders in order 
to create a nation-state. 
Homelands and borders are not real things but are imagined as much as national 
identity is. Traditional homelands are the initial glue between the nation and the creation of a 
state (Smith 1991). As such, whenever a homeland is identified by a nation and nationalism 
takes sway, the drive to create a state by bounding the homeland with a defined border is 
inevitable (Diener and Hagen 2010). Homelands fluctuate in size and location as the nation 
claiming them alters their perceptions of the space and their place in it. People seek to 
“extend their boundaries to the limits of their cultures” so as to consolidate their nation in a 
place of their own control (Gellner and Breuilly 2008, 54). People who identify themselves 
as separate from other peoples often seek to physically separate themselves as well. 
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Ironically, borders have become more precisely mapped creations in the last few 
centuries. The predominant reason for this seems to be the decrease in frontiers. There are 
more humans occupying land than previously and the space they occupy more than likely 
bumps up to other occupied spaces. The frontier, the vast and open unknown, has been 
reduced to borderlands. Borderlands give birth to borders as peoples on either side of them 
seek a firm separation of each from one another (Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 87).  
When discussing borders there is a natural inclination to describe them in terms of 
physical geographical features, as if natural geography alone determined border locations. If 
natural geography did not determine the location of borders then the alternate hypothesis for 
where borders are drawn is where conflicts put them. In the literature review and in the case 
studies, both of these alternate hypotheses are discussed and refuted as the only variables at 
play.  
Influence of Geography on Borders 
One simply cannot discuss political geography without discussing physical geography. 
When examining a map, it is all too easy to draw the conclusion that in many cases borders 
were drawn on top of convenient physical landmarks and barriers. Rivers, coastlines, and 
mountain ranges all make for easy borders separating people. That statement alone is why 
geography might provide the basis for a successful border rather than where national 
identities would desire it. Yet, the physical boundary is often the best option for a border 
because it already naturally separates nations from each other. Nations develop claims to the 
land they already occupy out of convenience. 
Natural geography can often explain state behavior as states vie for resources and the 
economic power that grants them, but natural geographic features are not used as borders in 
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some cases. There can be plenty of reasons for this but it can often be seen that the value of 
the feature to a nation overrides its usefulness as a border. The land value, either for 
traditional reasons or mineral value, demands that a people push the border past the terrain 
feature. Rivers hide gold. Mountains hide gems. Canyons hide minerals. Though all of these 
provide an obvious division of land, there is economic value in owning both sides. Even if 
there are economic reasons for seizing an area, the justification for taking and holding an area 
is frequently best wrapped in a nation’s identity. Territorial claims are manufactured and 
people moved to make it a reality in order to expand. The economic reasoning is not as 
justifiable on the world stage as national interest is. 
Similarly, the value of owning a geographic feature as a tool for the defense of one’s 
homeland provides justification for ownership in the eyes of a nation. The nation will embed 
within itself a natural right to the borderland as a means of self-preservation. For example, 
the Golan Heights overlooking the state of Israel is a strategic location providing easier 
offense into Israel. Israel has, in response, occupied that land as a matter of self-preservation 
because it is also an easily defended area though it is not considered Israeli territory. Over 
time, the occupation of Golan has embedded the right to the land in the Zionist identity (Lavi 
2013). Continued ownership of the land has been justified for reasons of national identity, 
that is, the land belongs to the Jewish homeland. Though the modern occupation of Golan 
can be seen for defensive reasons, even the expansion into the territory can be viewed 
through the lens of protecting the nation as a function of the national identity. 
National identity is often not just the excuse used for grabbing land for economic 
reasons. By using national identity as the excuse, it becomes the reason. The fluidity of 
national identity and yet its strength in the minds of the people makes it easy for a fabricated 
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claim to land to become a hotly contested area for centuries to come. This is because there 
are no real claims to any land. Although, the concept of a traditional homeland is strong in 
the creation of a national identity, homelands are as arbitrary as nations are.  
The border between France and Germany has been hotly contested in many bloody 
conflicts. Negotiated settlements at the end of each of these conflicts have pushed the border 
back and forth across vast tracts of territory, such as Alsace-Lorraine. While the area 
contested does have valuable resources, the claim on the land by both France and Germany is 
rooted in the identities of both. World wars, advanced democracy, and modernity have not 
changed the fact that Germany believes it has a right to the territory because Germans live 
there and that France sees their medieval claim to the land as superseding this.  
Influence of Conflict on Borders 
The influence of conflicts on alterations to political geography is central to the study 
of states. Conflicts often result in changes to state borders. Regardless of the type of conflict, 
changes can, and often do, happen. The incidence of conflict can be described as being a 
matter of opportunity and willingness (Most and Starr 1989). Opportunity, in this case, is 
defined by the proximity of one state to another, which in the most common of circumstances 
means the states border one another. Willingness is more of interest to this research. 
There are two ways of looking at the role of borders in conflict: Borders are causes of 
conflict or borders are sites of conflict. One of the most-used methods of describing 
international conflicts is describing them as dyads, or containing two parts, which in this case 
are states (Quackenbush 2015, 14-5). States that share borders are closer in proximity to one 
another and are therefore more likely to come into conflict (Starr 2005, 391). States with 
longer borders more likely to come into conflict because there is more over which they can 
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argue (Wesley 1962). There are examples of states that are close in proximity and also share 
a long border, but are neither rivals nor in conflict, such as the United States and Canada. 
Border and territory by themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient for conflict (Starr and 
Thomas 2005, 137). Similarly, many conflicts do not end in territorial shifts, a more common 
outcome in the post-Cold War world. 
More important than conflict’s influence is the question of what is driving conflict 
that inevitably results in the movement of borders. National identity serves this purpose by 
demanding the securing of a homeland for its people. Therefore, borders alone are not the 
cause for conflict, and conflict alone does not give sufficient reason to move borders. 
Conflicts offer an opportunity for states to move borders. Borders also provide an 
opportunity for conflict. The willingness comes from the needs of the nation as it creates 
reasons for conflict. 
Perhaps the most obvious historic example of conflict waged in the name of nation is 
the Second World War as fought in Europe. Germany began the conflict by seeking to unify 
German-speaking peoples under one state controlling what was believed to be the traditional 
homeland of Germanic people. The annexation of Austria as well as the Sudetenland in what 
was previously Czechoslovakia are prime examples of state borders being shifted to 
accommodate the national borders. Of course, German-speaking Czechs may not have 
considered themselves Germans despite the linguistic difference, but the national identity of 
the German people required a state owning all territory inhabited by German speakers (Smith, 
1986). This phenomenon is referred to as irredentism and is more common than just this 
well-known historical example. Even today there are numerous irredenta, or places with 
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territorial claims on the basis of nation. Many national borders as conceived in their 
respective identities overlap, causing the conflicts that frequently result in new borders. 
In the case of Germany in the Second World War, the annexation of lands containing 
German-speaking peoples was just the beginning of a larger territorial conflict. The ultimate 
goal of the conflict as conceived in the minds of Nazi leadership was the expansion of 
German borders as far as possible to provide room for ethnically German people to live at the 
expense of, including the eradication of, non-Germanic peoples. The altering of borders by 
way of conflict was conditional on the national identity of Germans that changed to include 
the need for space beyond their conceived homeland. 
Hypothesis 
The question at hand is specifically whether or not national identity is the source of 
changes to state borders. By using the German model, we can test whether or not the classic 
European model of national identity influence on states holds true for modern states. Thus, 
the hypothesis is that the German model of state creation holds true for new states where 
national identity is created and then dictates border placement. 
Theoretical Approach 
It would only be natural to take a realist approach to examining state borders, as 
borders are a source of order that states use to ensure their own power. The presence of a 
border denotes the physical presence of state control. The realist tradition views states as the 
centers of power in the international system (Waltz 1979; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985; 
Mearsheimer 2001). They have the ability to negotiate with or make war on other states in 
order to create borders to maximize their own power. Borders are even drawn in a zero-sum 
style with very little land unclaimed by states. Of course, in a purely realist world, the most 
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power to be gained is in control over the largest territory (Mearsheimer 2001). Realism 
would suggest that the source of the movement of borders is the anarchy of the international 
system wherein states compete for the opportunity to expand and control more. If the 
international system is a zero-sum game, then control of territory is the physical 
manifestation of said game. 
Realism suffers from some drawbacks with regards to this line of thought. On closer 
examination, not all territory is worth the same and some territory costs more to hold and 
control than is gained. By going to war in order to gain territory, all states wager resources 
they might not get back in either success or failure. The realist explanation for state conflict 
suggests that states would continue as able to expand by consuming other states in order to 
increase their power. Though many states have territorial claims on lands owned by other 
states, there are many states satisfied with their borders that seek power through other means. 
Power is not gained exclusively through territorial conquest. Changes to borders cannot be 
solely explained by realism. 
Alternatively, institutional liberalism suggests the reliance on borders by the 
international system as an institution that all states recognize. A state border is something 
shared by two states. There are no land borders that exist without a state on either side. 
Therefore the border becomes a tacit agreement or partnership between the two states. 
Borders can be codified in terms of bilateral agreements, such as trade agreements and 
mutual defense pacts. Borders can also simply be reduced in importance through the rise of 
institutions, as in the case of the World Trade Organization or the European Union. 
Institutional liberalism suggests that such organizations would overshadow and inevitably 
erode the importance of borders (Keohane 2005). Borders persist nonetheless and continue to 
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influence decision-making of states. For example, identities of European states persist despite 
the call to form a regional, shared identity.  
The use of the German model greatly influences the theoretical approach. 
Constructivism is the chosen theoretical approach to examine how national identity affects 
borders. Borders are not static nor are they permanent. Borders move, as well as come and go 
with the rise and fall of states. A state border, though necessary to the structure of a state, is 
arbitrarily drawn. This calls into question of why it may be drawn one place and not another, 
or why the border is fortified as opposed to open. The preferences of the people on either side 
of a border contribute to the role and location of the border by influencing the state to do as 
prescribed (Wendt 1992, 213). Through the theoretical lens of constructivism, national 
identity becomes the primary factor in border creation. Borders are not just tools of state 
power but also expressions of national identity. 
Before states can utilize borders as power structures, they must first define borders as 
necessary to their security. This requires an understanding of the border as providing 
meaning to the nation (Finnemore 1996). In this sense the state and its structure become 
responsive to the will of the people inhabiting it. The will of a people is most accurately 
depicted through the imagination of its national identity. This thesis abandons the state as the 
primary actor in determining border locations in favor of the will of the people. The defining 
of a people as a nation brings forth a natural comparison to those who do not belong to the 
nation. The border is the tool used to physically separate the ‘us’ from the ‘them’ in any 
landscape. 
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Case Selection 
The cases selected for study of national identity and state borders are South Sudan 
and Eritrea. These cases follow Mill’s Method of Similarity in that the independent variables 
examined are not common to both cases but the dependent variable is. Both cases have the 
similar result that a new border was drawn separating the new state from the old one. While 
all changes to borders, including flat-out creation, can be seen as simply creating a new 
border, the case selection supports the specific creation of entirely new borders as opposed to 
altering the placement of an older border. The independent variables utilized were ethnicity, 
religion, language, and nationalism. Certain other variables were controlled in order to 
reduce their effect on the analysis. Specifically, to evaluate the continuing relevance of the 
European model necessitated utilizing states that are not located in Europe. Both states 
examined are East African states that have only recently come into existence after seceding 
from their parent state, Sudan and Ethiopia respectively. Both states were created by similar 
conflicts. Additionally, both states came into being around the same time, eliminating 
concerns about time difference between the cases studied.  
Eritrea and South Sudan are in the same region of world and share a similar colonial 
background. Both cases are unusual in terms of African state creation, as most states in 
Africa today are continuations of the colonial states that preceded them. Most borders in 
Africa today were drawn on the map based on the territorial claims of colonizing Europeans. 
As such, these borders took into account very little of the on-the-ground reality of what was 
there, much less where people were already located. To see whole new states made in a 
region of the world with a history of minimal border alteration or state creation is an 
opportunity to identify the influence of national identity as separated from regional identities. 
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Methodology 
In order to discover the influence of national identity on state borders, the two case 
studies described above are examined separately and compared to the German model 
examined above. The cases examined were selected because they share the same dependent 
variable that a new border was created separating the state from the parent state. As such, 
there should be a noticeable similarity in the creation of a national identity in the new nation-
state separate from the national identity of the parent state. Any differences in the reasons for 
the location of their borders should be most noticeable by comparing these cases to the model. 
These cases, if proven to be both products of a shift in national identity, prove the utility of 
the German model of state border creation and provide an archetypal case of how national 
identity holds sway over border creation. 
The cases to be studied are constructed by first describing the situation and the history 
behind the secession of each new nation-state from its respective parent state. The markers of 
national identity are then identified in relation to the physical location of the borders. From 
there, the new borders are defined with any available material to explain the decision to 
locate them where they are. Where possible, maps are used to identify the location of the 
markers of national identity in relation to where the borders were created. In order to separate 
undesired variables, conflict lines and natural geographic features are placed on maps or 
described as available. These independent variables, conflict and physical features, are 
intended to be eliminated in favor of the markers of national identity. In the absence of maps, 
the regions in question are described. 
The markers of national identity to be used (language, ethnicity, and religion) are 
operationalized for this research by identifying their differences between the seceding state 
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and the parent state, if they exist and where they exist. The use of these markers in 
identifying the secessionist state as separate from the parent state within the literature prior to 
and during the conflict should signify the rise of a new national identity. If the new borders 
fall along the division of these separate nations, then the national markers will be considered 
as the source of the change in national identity and also the change in the borders by way of 
conflict. 
What role does national identity play in changes to state borders? The use of 
comparison of these cases to the model should illuminate whether or not the model has value 
in describing the creation of nation-states. The imagination of a nation separate from others 
lies in the differences seen in the markers from one people to another. When coupled with a 
natural desire for territoriality, the nation becomes a state. States are created through the 
creation of borders. Borders must therefore be the result of the imagination of a national 
identity. Similarly, changes in borders are the result of changes in national identity. 
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Chapter Two: Eritrea and Ethiopia 
While several conflicts have occurred in and between Eritrea and Ethiopia, this case 
study is specific to the Eritrean War of Independence that began on 1 September 1961 and 
ended in 29 May 1991 after 30 years of warfare. While a referendum was held almost two 
years later, in 1993, with actual independence recognized by the international community in 
the same year, these events are not necessary to describe the creation of the Eritrean-
Ethiopian border or the effect of Eritrean national identity may have had on it. Similarly, the 
Eritrean-Ethiopian War and all of the border skirmishes that have occurred since the 
establishment of Eritrea as an independent country are not studied as a part of this case. As 
aforementioned, the focus of the case is the creation of Eritrea as a new state in the 
international system separate from Ethiopia. 
Background 
The Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples were at one point a part of a single kingdom with 
a similar culture throughout. While there are obvious cultural differences between those 
peoples living in the highlands and those living in the lowlands of the Horn of Africa, the 
Aksumite Kingdom that existed in the region near the beginning of the Common Era was 
comprised of all of these peoples. The introduction of Christianity and Islam to the region 
also had minimal effect on delineating the region into smaller nations. 
The defining moment in the history of the region was the conquest of the coastline by 
the Italians in the late nineteenth century. Though Africa was divided by the European 
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powers into colonies, not all areas were conquered. Eritrea was under Italian rule, separate 
from what would become modern-day Ethiopia. As a colony, Eritrea developed faster than 
Ethiopia. At the end of World War II, Britain took over trusteeship of Eritrea until the United 
Nations combined it with Ethiopia in 1952 in a federation (Tronvoll 1999, 1043; Tareke 
2009). The Ethiopian state caused many problems for Eritrea over the next decade as it 
continuously interfered in Eritrea’s loose ability to rule itself. The Ethiopian government had 
difficulties allowing an important province to create policy frequently against the wishes of 
the central government. These problems ended with Ethiopia annexing Eritrea and assuming 
all governmental control in 1962, beginning the war for independence (Tronvoll 1999, 1043). 
The conflict would last about 30 years as both Ethiopia and Eritrea dealt with internal 
power struggles and conflicts with other neighbors. Ethiopian forces were able to occupy 
large parts of Eritrea in the early 1960s, as Eritrean forces were slow to mobilize into a single 
unified fighting force. Eritrean resistance began with the creation of the Eritrean Liberation 
Front (ELF) in 1960 and morphed over time until the sole remaining organization 
prosecuting the war was the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1970. The collapse 
of the Ethiopian regime in 1974 coupled with the liberation of the Eritrean capital of Asmara 
in 1991 resulted in negotiations toward the establishment of Eritrea as an independent state in 
1993. 
National Identity 
Language 
Prior to the war for independence, there was no single language common across 
Eritrea. Tigrinya speakers were the largest group but not by much. The plains areas inhabited 
by the Tigre slowly adopted Arabic for religious use, but even Arabic did not have 
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substantial penetration aside from the use in affairs by Muslims. Italian was also spoken but 
it was the common language across all the ethno-linguistic areas in Eritrea rather than the 
preferred language of use (Tareke 2009). The ELF made the key decision to run the war for 
independence by splitting Eritrea into ethno-linguistic zones, each run by its own leadership 
(Tareke 2009, 61). These groups would organize and prosecute the war on their own with 
vague oversight from the ELF until the EPLF took over. The EPLF maintained some basic 
semblance of this arrangement but fragmented groups further into cell structures similar to 
the Vietnamese. The ethno-linguistic organizations were reduced to the smallest element to 
fight Ethiopia. Each village was now its own unit with assistance from the greater EPLF, 
which centered in the Christian highlands, home to the Tigrinya (Tareke, 2009). 
In Ethiopia, just across the border from Eritrea, are large groupings of Tigre and Afar 
speakers. Yet, the national language of Ethiopia was Amharic from the Amharan people, who 
held the ethnic majority. When Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia, Amharic was made the 
official language there too. It was to be used in all government and business practices as well 
as taught in schools over all other languages. As seen in Figure 1, there are no identified 
Amharic speakers in Eritrea. That ethno-linguistic group exists predominantly in the central 
and northwestern regions, to include the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, 
Eritrean forces under the control of the EPLF never adopted a singular national language. 
Though they fought Ethiopian forces that utilized a singular language, Eritreans sought to 
maintain their right to speak a language of their choice. 
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Figure 1. Eritrean Ethno-linguistic Groups 
Source: Tronvoll, Kjetil, and Daniel R. Mekonnen. 2014. The African Garrison State: 
Human Rights & Political Development in Eritrea. Rochester, NY: James Currey, p. x. 
 
Ethnicity 
The greater Horn of Africa is home to a myriad of ethnic groupings. Eritrea itself is 
home to several major ethnic groups. In this sense, there are no Eritrean people. Eritrea is a 
territory inhabited by the Tigrinya, Afar, Saho, Tigre, Beni Amer, and Kunama peoples 
(Tronvoll 1999, 1054). Eritrea is a multi-ethnic place that shares these ethnic groups with 
Ethiopia. Though other nearby provinces rebelling against Ethiopia were ethnically 
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homogenous, only Eritrea was successful in gaining its independence from Ethiopia, but not 
due to any singular ethnic difference. 
The victory over Ethiopia created the Eritrean state at the same time that it destroyed 
the Eritrean nation. Eritreans saw themselves in a fight against Ethiopians. The states 
involved served the role that ethnicity might as a matter of ‘us versus them’ as it would in 
other cases (Tronvoll 1999, 1055). The defeat of Ethiopia ended the tentative peace between 
ethnic groupings that was maintained in order to fight the bigger threat: Ethiopians. 
Religion 
Eritrean and Ethiopian history is unique from a religious perspective in that the 
Kingdom of Aksum, the fledgling kingdom located in the area at the beginning of the 
Common Era, was one of the first to adopt Christianity as its state religion. Since then, and 
due to the close proximity of the Islamic world across the Gulf of Aden, Islam had spread 
across parts of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Prior to the move to secede, there was almost no 
difference in the religious make up between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Makki 2011). Christians 
and Muslims were settled in both areas with Christians outnumbering Muslims only slightly 
in both states. 
As Eritrea separated itself from Ethiopia, the relationship between the state and 
religion played a role in galvanizing the perception of the differences between the states. 
Ethiopia and Eritrea both had a large number of Christians and Muslims in their populations. 
Yet, the treatment of the religions was different in each, which provided a reason to rally to 
Eritrean nationalism. Eritrea recognized equal rights for its Muslim population to its 
Christian population where Ethiopian Muslims were considered second-class citizens to the 
Christian Ethiopians (Tareke 2009, 57). Italian rule in the area had brought a secularist 
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outlook in governing Eritrea that was absent in Ethiopia. Ethiopia still held onto its Christian 
Aksumite history though Muslims were numerically larger than ever. 
Nationalism 
The rise of Eritrean nationalism was the result of a vacuum of power that led to the 
EPLF taking sole charge for the liberation of Eritrea from Ethiopian forces (Tronvoll 1999). 
The EPLF was not an ethno-nationalist organization and Eritrean was never an ethnic 
category (Tronvoll 1999, 1054). Though there is a distinct and unique quality of being 
Eritrean from that of Ethiopian, the difference lies with the colonial past. Eritrea had a 
different history than Ethiopia as a colony of Italy. As such, it had more modern 
infrastructure and its bureaucracy was developed in the image of Italy’s while Ethiopia still 
relied on the trappings of the old monarchy. Ethiopia’s national identity was a function of the 
ethnic culture of the largest group (Deng 2008, 35). Eritrea never developed such a tie. 
The Border 
The border between Eritrea and Ethiopia is a near perfect match to the provincial 
border used by the Italians when they occupied Eritrea and administrated Ethiopia, as seen in 
Figure 2. This border was affected in large part by the frontlines of the fight between Italian 
colonial forces and Ethiopian forces. When the fighting ceased, Italy took ownership of the 
area they had occupied (Negash 1987). The border they used crossed ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious areas in the region. 
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Figure 2. African Colonization 
Source: Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority 
and Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 69. 
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Figure 3. Map of Eritrea 
Source: Makki, Fouad. 2011. "Culture and Agency in a Colonial Public Sphere: Religion and 
the Anti-colonial Imagination in 1940s Eritrea." Social History 36, no. 4: 418-442. 
 
Perhaps the easiest way to tell that natural geographic features were not the basis for 
the border is the presence of straight lines on the map. Straight lines do not exist in nature but 
The political conjuncture of 1940s Eritrea provides a particularly illuminating context for
exploring these more general themes. As a distinct territorial entity, the Eritrea we know today
was the direct product of the extraordinary extension of Italy’s politico-military power
between 1869 and 1890. Prior to its incarnation as Italian Eritrea, it had no common political
Figure 1. Map of Eritrea.
November 2011 Religion and the anti-colonial imagination in 1940s Eritrea 419
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humans can imagine them. Though the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia follows the Setit 
River for a while, it makes a leap to the Mereb River via a straight line, as depicted in Figure 
3. Of course, in examining the rest of the border from West to East, there are sections that do 
not follow rivers, mountains, or depressions as might be expected. 
Near the end of the conflict, Ethiopian forces held positions deep in Eritrean territory. 
The guerilla campaign that eventually led to the success of the Eritrean war for independence 
did not rely on solidly identifiable frontlines as would be expected, or even as seen in 
European conflicts. Instead the Ethiopian military was forced to fight a counterinsurgency 
until the point at which they had been weakened enough that Eritreans could win battles in 
the open (Tareke 2009; Reid 2011). The border as it exists does mimic the frontline in the 
Italian conquest of the region when they ceased operations and sought peaceful coexistence 
with their Ethiopian neighbors. Conflict clearly played a part in determining where the border 
would end up but not the conflict in question. Rather the old provincial border from Italian 
colonial days, which was a product of military conquest, had become engrained in the minds 
of Eritreans as delineating their national homeland. Hence, they reverted to that border at the 
end of the conflict. 
Analysis 
The basis for what made Eritrea a nation is predominantly its colonial past. While 
there were fewer distinctions between Eritrea and Ethiopia in terms of ethnicity and religion, 
Eritrea fell under direct occupation and control of colonial Italian authorities while Ethiopia 
did not. Even later when Ethiopia was administered by Italy, it was not controlled by Italian 
authorities the way Eritrea was. Eritrea developed faster than Ethiopia. Its government was 
secularized and did not favor any ethnicity. Ethiopia’s government, even as evolved, never 
  30 
 
let go of its Christian Asmaran past. When Ethiopia annexed Eritrea and attempted to enforce 
its customs, Eritrea became a nation whose identity was borrowed from its Italian colonial 
past. What sustained Eritrea throughout the war for independence was a conceptualization of 
being Eritrean versus being Ethiopian. 
Given the relevance of Italy’s ownership of Eritrea to its national identity as it fought 
for independence, it should not be surprising that the administrative border used by Italian 
colonial authorities was utilized as the border of choice upon Eritrea gaining independence. 
The border had been used to delineate Eritrea from Ethiopia since Italy conquered Eritrea. 
Eritreans became the civilized people to the barbarian Ethiopians (Negash 1987). The border 
was maintained under British trusteeship following World War II and maintained again when 
Eritrea and Ethiopia were federated by the United Nations. Eritreans had come to view the 
border as the extent of their homeland. 
Unlike Germany, which organized itself around a singular administrative language 
common to all, Eritrea remained fractured among its ethno-linguistic groups. German 
peoples could all make a claim to being of Germanic decent, a central ethnic grouping 
separate from those surrounding them. Eritrea shares ethnic roots with Ethiopians as well as 
being divided within itself into multiple groups. Germans aligned themselves religiously as a 
Protestant group separate from the Catholic nations nearby. Eritrea and Ethiopia shared an 
equal mix of Christian and Muslim peoples. Eritrea only preferred secularization to the 
Christian government in Ethiopia. 
Eritrea fails to meet the standard proposed by the German model of national identity 
as the source of state border creation. The core markers of national identity are still being 
negotiated even today in Eritrea. Due to the fact that there was no single ethnic group that 
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stood out as the victors in the fight against Ethiopia, there is continued ethnic tension in 
Eritrea that leadership has attempted to fix by resorting to mandatory national service in the 
military in order to artificially create Eritrean nationalism (Tronvoll & Mekonnen 2014). 
The borders Eritrea shares with its neighbors, specifically with Ethiopia, are still 
contested. In some ways this case can be seen as a deviation from the proposed model where 
the borders are the source of national identity rather than national identity being the source of 
borders. The only marker that aligns in any way is that Eritreans viewed their homeland of 
Eritrea, as conceived by their Italian colonial administrators, to make them separate and 
unique from Ethiopia, with whom they actually share many characteristics. The border used 
today is the border Italy created and what it is to be Eritrean is a function of living on one 
side of that border. 
  
  32 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three: South Sudan and Sudan 
South Sudan began its quest for independence long before Sudan was even an 
independent state. It was only after the Second Sudanese Civil War lasting from April 1983 
to January 2005 that South Sudan was able to achieve some measure of independence. True 
independence came about after a referendum in January 2011 with statehood occurring in 
July 2011. The case involving the secession of South Sudan from Sudan occurred 
simultaneous to and in relation to conflicts Sudan had with other peoples, including both 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. No international action occurs uniquely by itself without influence from 
and on other events. This case, similar to the case involving Eritrea, focuses on just the 
creation of South Sudan and the conflict that brought about the newly independent state. The 
conflict in Darfur, Blue Nile, and border skirmishes are not addressed unless they offer 
information specific to the case at hand. 
Background 
Sudan has been home to multiple conflicts for decades. Like most of the African 
states, Sudan was a colonial holding. British colonial forces occupied Sudan as a part of their 
colonial occupation of Egypt. When Egypt gained independence, Sudan remained a British 
colonial holding only until Egypt also removed its claims to the land and allowed Sudan 
independence. Sudanese independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom was achieved in 
1956. 
  33 
 
South Sudan was first created as a province of Sudan at independence in 1956. The 
capital of Sudan and the northern regions became predominantly Arab and Muslim as 
opposed to the African and Christian South. The First Sudanese Civil War from 1955 to 1972 
was a result of religious and ethnic tensions as the South attempted to maintain some 
measure of regional autonomy. South Sudan was allowed to operate autonomously from the 
North as a part of the agreement that ended the first civil war. The Second Sudanese Civil 
War from 1983 to 2005 was fought for similar reasons as Islamic fundamentalists gained 
power in Sudan and terminated the autonomy of South Sudan in 1983 (Woodward, 2013). 
The agreement at the end of the war guaranteed autonomy for six years after which a 
referendum for independence would be held. The referendum was passed with an 
overwhelming majority voting for independence in 2011. 
The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which created the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983, was the primary organization that fought the 
Second Sudanese Civil War for the independence of South Sudan. Their goal was to regain 
the autonomy lost when Islamic fundamentalists gained control of the government. The 
SPLM/A fought not just in South Sudan but operated as a rebel group throughout all of 
Sudan, claiming to fight for all oppressed Sudanese (Lesch 1998). When the fighting ceased 
in 2005, the SPLM/A removed itself from the problems of the other regions in Sudan to 
focus on developing South Sudan as a state. 
National Identity 
Language 
Prior to the independence of South Sudan, Sudan was in the process of replacing 
indigenous languages with Arabic by suppressing the use of those languages. Arabic became 
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the dominant language spoken by being the only accepted language used in business, 
government, and school (Lesch 1998). The North had substantially higher majorities of 
Arabic speakers than the South though several northern provinces had sizable minorities of 
indigenous language speakers. Nevertheless, Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, was nearly 
completely Arabic speaking and its political leaders enforced the use of Arabic as the official 
language of Sudan (Lesch 1998; Idris 2013). The development of the Sudanese national 
identity as Arab-Islamic precluded the use of other languages, including English that was 
utilized during British colonial occupation. To northern nationalists, not adopting Arabic was 
in a sense opposing “the will of God” as Sudan developed as an Islamic state (Idris 2013, 73). 
Arabic was the national language of Sudan and a part of the national identity of northern 
Sudanese. It was not within the identity of southern Sudanese. 
South Sudan spoke a number of indigenous languages, as seen in Figure 4. They also 
retained the use of the common language of English, against the influence of Arabic spoken 
by most of the North as well as the Sudanese government. The resistance to the use of Arabic 
in schools and business was one of the problems that led to the Second Sudanese Civil War. 
Southern leadership saw the enforcement of Arabic as a denial of Sudanese multiculturalism 
in favor of a singular ethno-linguistic heritage. Northern nationalists taking over the 
government in Khartoum upon independence from Britain and Egypt created a fear of what 
southern leadership considered “internal colonialism,” where the North was attempting to 
colonize the South through culture (Idris 2013, 76). The North sent government officials to 
enforce the use of Arabic and Islamic law in the South. South Sudan did not rally behind a 
single language in order to create a national identity in competition with the North’s national 
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identity. Their national identity recognized multiculturalism as a rejection of the North’s 
aggressive national identity. 
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Figure 4. Sudanese Ethno-linguistic Groups 
Source: Lesch, Ann M. 1998. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, p. 16. 
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Ethnicity 
Though the North is considered Arab-Islamic, Sudan’s ethnic makeup is actually 
Arabized groups of other ethnicities (Lesch 1998, 15). This is a result of the Arab culture 
being absorbed by the lower Nile areas as it was in Egypt. The ethnic background of South 
Sudan is comprised of many African tribal groups with few external groups due to cultural 
infusion and colonization. As seen in Figure 4, the South featured great ethnic diversity in 
comparison to the North. Hundreds of smaller groups existed across the South that had 
different ethnic heritages from one another. This striking difference in groups in the South 
did not affect British policy towards the South as the British lumped all these groups together. 
During their rule, the British colonial authorities crafted their ‘Southern Policy’ specifically 
to segregate the African South from the Arab North (Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan 
2013, 5). This policy served as the basis for the origin of a border between the two regions. 
When the Sudanese government attempted to create for itself a singular national 
identity in line with a singular ethnic identity, they “excluded, demarcated, and demonized 
the people of Southern Sudan” (Idris 2013, 67). The North continued to grow more 
homogenous as Arabism became more engrained in society. This was not so in the South. 
Though the SPLA originally advocated for a united Sudan that without any ethnic 
prioritization, the Arab northerners saw them as African barbarians invading. The Arab 
northerners were ethnically opposed to southerners because they were black, where black 
was considered to be “of low social status and origin” (Idris 2013, 72). Southern leadership, 
especially in the SPLA, continued to push for an egalitarian and unified Sudan, ignorant of 
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the ethnic tension building in the North (Johnson 2013, 149). Though the concept of a united 
Sudan was attractive to some in the North, secession became a more realistic solution. 
The resulting ethnic nationalism from before and during the Second Sudanese Civil 
War was not on the side of South Sudan. The South never developed a core ethnic identity. 
Quite the opposite was true for the North, where a very firm Arab ethnic identity developed 
that informed their decision-making. Arab became synonymous with civilized and cultured 
(Idris 2013; Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan 2013). The South’s national identity was 
born from being marginalized and not from any common ethnic background (Woodward 
2013, 89). Though the North saw the South as lowborn blacks, southerners did not conceive 
of themselves as sharing even the common blackness ascribed to them. 
Religion 
Islam was one of the unifying factors for the North. Arab culture and the Arabic 
language became commonplace across most of Sudan through the adoption of Islam. It was a 
homogenizing force that created a nation within Sudan (Idris 2013, 68-9). That nation 
excluded those living in what would become South Sudan. The government of Sudan in 
Khartoum, controlled by northern Sudanese, had more in common with its northern 
neighbors in Egypt than it did with its own southerners and the rest of Africa to the south. 
When Sudan gained independence, the British transferred authority to the Arab-Islamic 
groups in charge in the capital (Lesch 1998, 212; Idris 2013). The Arab-Islamic nationalists 
in the capital utilized their power to attempt to further homogenize Sudan by marginalizing 
the rights of other religious groups, specifically Christians (Sørbø and Ahmed 2013, 6-7). 
The South was geographically different from the North and more out of reach to the 
British colonial authorities. Missionaries more easily penetrated the South and brought 
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Christianity with them. Christianity also overflowed into the region from neighboring 
Ethiopia during the era of the Aksumite Kingdom, a Christian-African kingdom (Lesch 1998, 
17-8). Prior to the infusion of Christianity in South Sudan, numerous animist traditions 
existed, some of which still are practiced today.  
The religious aspect of the conflict is perhaps the most salient to the issue of national 
identity in the case of South Sudan. The conflict was framed in opposition to the government 
in Sudan attempting to enforce Islam as the state religion and sharia law as the religiously 
based code of law (Lesch 1998). Yet, despite more South Sudanese practicing Christianity 
than traditional religions native to the area, the SPLM/A did not frame their conflict in terms 
of restoring their right to practice Christianity over Islam. There was little combativeness in 
their messaging as they promoted a united Sudan that allowed for the practice of both Islam 
and Christianity equally. Southern leadership rejected the use of Islam exclusively. South 
Sudan did not adopt a singular religious identity. 
Nationalism 
The Second Sudanese Civil War, which led to the secession and independence of 
South Sudan, relied solely on the belief of the SPLM that the use of Arabic and Islam as 
mandated by the state was an infringement on the rights of the majority to maintain their own 
unique cultures. They “rejected the concept of fixed religious, linguistic, or ethnic majorities 
and minorities” arguing instead that their “basic rights” to individual culture must be 
maintained (Lesch 1998, 23). The rise of a national identity in South Sudan relied heavily on 
identifying who they were in opposition to the identity the North developed. Sudan itself was 
much more homogenous and sought a homogenous identity for the whole of the state in 
becoming Arab-Islamic (Idris 2013, 64). South Sudan had aspects of a common identity from 
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which to draw upon in the conflict but resorted instead to rallying against Sudanese identity 
instead. 
The Border 
The border between South Sudan and Sudan first came about in 1956 as a result of a 
decision to split the North and South along a provincial line used by the British during their 
administration of the area. The British never actually divided the North and the South 
through the use of a formal border (Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan 2013, 5). An assumed 
provincial divide was used informally. Over time, this informal border became a reality as 
the people began to separate themselves across the borderlands. The borderlands between the 
two Sudans remain informal since South Sudan’s independence and as fighting has erupted 
over resources and ethnic enclaves. 
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Figure 5. Political Map of South Sudan 
Source: Schomerus, Marieke, Lotje de Vries, and Christopher Vaughan. 2013. “Introduction: 
Negotiating Borders, Defining South Sudan.” In The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority 
and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, edited by C. Vaughan, M. 
Schomerus, and L. de Vries, 1-22. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
The North and the South are vastly dissimilar in geographical terms. The North is 
predominantly settled only along the fertile coasts of the Nile River. Nomadic groups live 
sporadically in the Saharan Desert on the western side of the Nile. The South is covered in 
wetlands, lakes, forests, and mountainous highlands. The border utilized is not located on the 
border between the sahel, grasslands adjacent to the desert, and the Saharan Desert. Instead, 
the sahel is presently divided by the border between Sudan and South Sudan. Additionally, 
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South Sudan claims ownership of portions of the Nile including both banks of the river rather 
than utilizing that natural feature as a natural border. The extent of their ownership of both 
banks does not include all of the arable land, which could be used as another natural border.  
The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan during the Second Sudanese Civil War 
had no bearing on the placement of the border. As aforementioned, the border chosen was the 
1956 provincial border, as it was understood to exist at that time. The SPLA occupied a 
sizable portion of the southern half of Sudan, including most of South Sudan. Their direct 
control did not extend across all of South Sudan as Sudan managed to capture most of the 
major cities in South Sudan. When a ceasefire was called in 2005, negotiation began between 
the Sudanese government and the SPLM. The negotiated settlement ignored all military 
conquest from either side. 
Analysis 
One of the main aspects of the imagination of South Sudan as a separate nation from 
that of Sudan is in the inherent otherness that Sudan represented. Though Sudan was a 
multiethnic state with numerous languages and religions, its government organized into an 
Arab-Islamic state with Arabic as the state language, Islam as the state religion, and sharia 
law as the legal code. All of these were objectionable to those living in what would become 
South Sudan. South Sudan was made up of African peoples who commonly spoke English 
and mostly practiced Christianity. Despite these differences, South Sudan created its identity 
as opposition to the Arab-Islamic North rather than utilizing the African-Christian South 
identity. The independence movement began as an attempt to remain united under acceptable 
terms rather than to separate entirely. While this identity as being in conflict with the Arab-
Islamic North was enough to justify the war for independence, its result since independence 
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has been conflict between the ethnic groups that inhabit the new state. South Sudan’s 
national identity prior to victory was built solely on opposition to the North and never 
coalesced around any specific traits. 
The border utilized to separate South Sudan from Sudan was the provincial border 
used by the British during their administration in 1956, which Sudan used as well since 
independence. The old 1956 border simply delineated where the British thought the divide 
between the North and South should be. The British colonial administration never actually 
truly delineated the provincial border as used. Instead, roughly where the provincial border 
existed and the international boundary exists today, the British assumed a soft border that 
only became more formal through the natural separation of Northerners and Southerners. 
There is now concern that utilizing the 1956 border is not representative of where South 
Sudan truly is, creating border conflict since 2011. People who consider themselves South 
Sudanese have been caught on the wrong side of the 1956 border. This serves to further the 
point that the border was not created with respect to where national identity might have 
placed it at the time of state creation. In fact, the border was placed according to the older 
agreement rather than reflecting where national identity existed at the time of demarcation. 
Nationalists in Sudan prior to Sudan’s independence imagined themselves as an 
Arab-Islamic nation like their Egyptian neighbors to the north. In doing so they segregated 
themselves from the South, which was more classically colonial Africa. South Sudan 
considered itself to African in comparison to Sudan being Arab. It spoke English to Sudan’s 
Arabic. The majority of its people practiced Christianity to Sudan’s Islam. Yet, none of these 
characteristics became the traits used to identify what was South Sudanese as opposed to 
Sudanese. Because the conflict was wrapped in the message of freeing South Sudan from the 
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oppressive northern culture, there was no single national identity to develop out of the 
markers used in the German model. South Sudan instead developed a national identity based 
on conflict with the North, which crumbled when that conflict ended. As such, it fails to 
match the German model. The border followed the inherited colonial border rather than any 
sense of national identity on the part of South Sudan. 
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Conclusion 
When creating an identity, one must invariably determine what one is not as a part of 
the process of determining what one is. This creates an automatic dichotomy between those 
who are and those who are not. National identity is no different in its construction and 
application, but is applied to a broader grouping of people. Because of the strength of 
national identity in creating a desire for a homeland for similar people, there is reason to 
believe that national identity is the source of the need to create territorial borders dividing 
nations, and ultimately creating nation-states. This research attempted to identify points 
where a surge in national identity might have resulted in the creation of new state borders 
that respected the geographical division of nations. 
The use of Germany as the model for how nations are imagined and then translated 
into states follows the common conception of the Europeanization of state creation. Europe 
divided conveniently into nation-states in one of two ways: constant warfare or imagined 
community. Constant warfare eventually eliminated for many states the other groups that 
lived within them until only a single nation remained to own the state, what might be 
considered the French Model. Germany serves as an example of the alternative where the 
state is built around the conception of a nation that previously was not. Modernity prohibits 
the constant warfare seen in European history (Herbst 2000). If states are created today, the 
common belief is that they will follow Germany’s example. 
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The case studies of Eritrea and South Sudan indicate that the German model for state 
creation does not hold for all examples. The bounding of Germany based on a common 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious background, though similar, is not the same as the bounding 
of Eritrea or South Sudan. Their experiences did in fact imagine themselves as separate from 
their parent state but that adversity is in large part the source of their identity. Neither was 
able to create a singular national identity based on a common ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
background. 
The other result of importance is the relevance of the colonial history of Eritrea and 
South Sudan to their national identity. If national identity is created from a shared history 
then the colonial experience of each should be included. Their colonial heritage both played 
into their national identity during conflict leading to independence and then was abandoned 
after independence. This interaction as a whole should not be surprising as national identity 
is described by Anderson as originating in Latin American colonies and not the European 
colonial powers (2006, 50-1). Colonialism has an important role in how identity is formed 
and utilized by a budding nation-state or national movement. What was not expected in the 
research was the degree to which the colonial past played a role in segregating the new state 
from their parent state. Both Eritrea and South Sudan utilized borders given from their 
colonial past. In this sense, the identity is borrowed from the colonizer but not the model. 
As the German model is not capable of explaining how these states split from their 
parent states, there is a need to explore a new model for the ideation and creation of new state 
borders. National identity undoubtedly plays a role, as both cases found some degree of the 
belief in the difference between one side and the other. This does not provide the sole 
rationale as neither case sustained a new national identity to continue justifying the new 
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border into the future. Other cases that share the colonial heritage could be compared to these 
to see if they share other variables as well that might have more of an impact on the result. 
Regardless, the example set by Europe in creating new nation-state borders is not shared by 
former colonies based on the cases presented. 
Modern borders can often be categorized as either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ in terms of their 
permeability. ‘Hard’ borders are specifically delineated on the map as they are in practice. 
Fences are built and guards are stationed. ‘Soft’ borders are usually on a map but in practice 
are often traversed by peoples on either side with some frequency. Research into the 
permeability of borders has often coincided with research into national identity as the flow of 
people across borders alters the nature of both the border and the identity of the people on 
either side. How diasporas affect the resiliency of borders as indicators of nations is worth 
examining in future research and may shed light onto why African states cling to colonial 
borders rather than creating state borders that respect national boundaries. 
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